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1 Introduction
Despite unevenness in the process, it is incontro-
vertible that the pace of global integration has
increased remarkably over the past two decades.
Much of the world's population, particularly those
with influence over the political process, has gained
as openness has grown. However, there is com-
pelling evidence that the benefits of globalisation
have not been spread evenly, and that openness has
been associated with growing unequalisation and,
in many cases, an increase in the incidence of
poverty These adverse developments express them-
selves both within and between countries.
The correlation between growing openness and
increasing inequality and poverty does not in itself
mean that these phenomena are causally related.
However, I will argue in this article that there are
indeed reasons why the increasing globalisation of
factor and financial markets leads to growing
inequality and poverty, both in developing and
industrialised countries. The entry of China into
world markets in the 1980s exacerbated trends that
were already in evidence during the process of
post-war trade liberalisation. As China increases its
participation in the global economy, and as India
and other low-wage developing economies follow
the same path, it is likely that there will be a further
squeeze on incomes, not just of the unskilled, but
also increasingly of semi-skilled and skilled labour.
I discussed many of the issues covered in this article
with Gordon (usually in that hotbed of intellectual
exchange, the Bristol pub). Gordon was acutely con-
cerned with the association between advancing glob-
alisation and the rapid advance of inequality, and its
harmful impact on working people. The title of this
article is one which I can visualise him tossing off. I
believe, too, that the following discussion accurately
reflects what was emerging in our discussion.
This is a shortened version of the paper presented to
the Gordon White Memorial Conference, 30 April 1999;
the longer version refers in more depth to cited works
and provides more data. Sarah Cook greatly aided my
understanding of the Chinese labour market, was largely
responsible for the section on the level and growth of
unemployment and underemployment in China and
made helpful comments on an earlier draft. I am
indebted to many of my colleagues for their assistance
and for comments on an earlier draft. Kenneth Fung,
Glenis Morrison and 1-loward White assisted me with
data. However, all errors of interpretation are mine alone.
Table 1: Ratio of country groups' share of global GDP to share of global population
Source: Calculated from World Bank, World Development Indicators, 1997
2 For Whom is Globalisation Not
All it is Cracked Up to Be?
One measure of globalisation is the ratio of trade to
GDP With the exception of Sub-Saharari Africa
(SSA) and Latin America and the Caribbean during
the 1980s, globalisation has grown at an astonish-
ing rate since 1980. Remarkably, this rate of growth
has been more rapid for poorer countries, as well as
for the two most populated economies, China and
India (Kaplirisky 1999).
What has happened to living standards during this
period of globalisation (here we will focus on earn-
ings, rather than non-financial indicators of poverty
and living standards)? There are two main
approaches to the measurement of poverty: that
which focuses on absolute living standards and that
which considers relative living standards. With
respect to absolute standards of living, between
1987 and 1993 - the only years for which data is
available, but a period of growing global integration
- the number of people living below the poverty line
(defined in terms of the domestic purchasing power
of $1 per day at 1985 prices) was unchanged (World
Bank 1996). However, even this picture is opti-
mistic, since with the crisis which beset the relatively
successful East Asian region in the late 1990s, it is
estimated that the total of those living below the
poverty line will increase from 1.3 billion in 1993 to
1.6 billion in the year 2000 (World Bank 1996). The
crisis of 1997-98 led to 89 million Indonesians
being thrust into poverty - defined as only one meal
a day .- (Economist, 19 September 1998) and the
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proportion of the Russian population living below
subsistence levels exceeded 35 per cent in early
1999 (Financial Times, 23 March 1999). This is
hardly a compelling case for the positive impact of
globalisation on absolute living standards.
This prevalence of falling incomes is not confined to
developing countries. Real wages in the
Netherlands fell between 1979 and 1997 (Hartog
1999). In the USA, real wages were lower in the
mid-1990s than they were in the late 1960s, and
family incomes have only held up as a consequence
of longer working hours and more working mem-
bers of the family
But what of the relationship of globalisation to rela-
tive living standards? Table 1 shows that, when we
compare different country groups' share of global
GDP to share of global population, it would appear
that inter-country income distribution has wors-
ened as the extent of global openness has increased.
Indeed, the only group which appears to have
gained relatively after 1970 was that of high-income
countries; other regions maintained their share at
best (East Asia and the Pacific and China) and the
rest experienced a significant decline in this ratio.
With respect to relative intra-national income dis-
tribution, at least in Latin America, there is evidence
of significant increases in inequality as countries
opened up over the last two decades (Streeten
1998; Bhalla 1998). Notably this includes Chile,
often thought to be the paradigmatic gainer from
globalisation, where the gini-coefficient increased
1970 1980 1985 1990 1995 1996
High-income countries 3.65 3.92 4.26 4.77 5.03 4.98
Middle-income countries 0.80 0.70 0.56 0.51 0.55
Low-income countries 0.17 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.10
Low-income excl. China and India 0.12 0.08 0.06 0.07
Latin America & Caribbean 0.78 0.82 0.79 0.66 0.69
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.27 0.29 0.17 0.14 0.10 0.10
East Asia & Pacific 0.26 0.22 0.20 0.17 0.27
China 0.15 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.12 0.14
India 0.14 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.08
2 This decline in income levels is matched by declines in per cent between 1972 and 1986 in the developing
the social wage. The proportion of social expenditure in world (World Bank data cited by Streeten, 1998).
total government expenditure declined from 35 to 29
from 0.46 in 1971 to 0.58 in 1989 (Rodrik 1999).
In the industrially advanced countries (lACs), since
the 1970s there has been a significant tendency
towards greater inequality in the OECD economies,
particularly in the Anglo-Saxon economies
(Dunford 1994). In developing countries, income
distribution too has tended to become more
unequal (Streete 1998). Inequality between skilled
and unskilled wage earners has also tended to
increase in the TACs (Wood 1994 and 1998) and in
Latin America over the past decade (Wood 1997).
3 Why did Globalisation Not
Deliver The Goods?
The outcomes that were described in the previous
section are not supposed to happen. Adam Smith
essentially saw international specialisation as a pro-
gressive force (Smith 1776:457) and he cautioned
against the too-rapid removal of these protective
measures (ibid: 469). However, amongst the classical
economists, it was Ricardo who is most clearly recog-
nised as arguing the benefits of global specialisation,
and hence of openness. Elaborating the principle of
comparative advantage, Ricardo showed that special-
isation in comparative advantage would work to the
benefit of all. There were, however, provisos required
for these benefits tobe reaped. First, capital must not
be internationally mobile; second, the trade between
countries should be balanced; third, mechanisms
should be in place to ensure a process of income
transfer from those who gained to those who lost;
and, finally and most importantly, all countries
should experience full employment.
As we shall see below, it is the last two of these
Ricardian assumptions that are most problematic.
Before we explore these limiting assumptions more
deeply, it is helpful first to briefly digress into the
contribution made by Schumpeter in our under-
standing of the barriers to entry that underwrite the
growth of sustainable incomes in a globalising
world. Elaborating Schumpeter's ideas, it is helpful
to distinguish the related concepts of commodities
and rent (Kaplinsky 1998). A commodity can be
defined as a product - and even a factor input -
where barriers to entry are low. Consequently, when
competition is intense the returns to the producers
Keynes, by contrast, believed that as incomes rose, so
Fertility fell, and this would naturally check the growth
of the reserve army of labour (Toye 1998).
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of these products, or to those factors which operate in
markets charactensed by low barriers to entry, fall. By
contrast, where barriers to entry are high, the incomes
of producers of the products or factors that are not
subject to intense competition will be protected.
The central contention of this article is that two
events have conspired to reduce the barriers to entry
in many sectors. First, during the recent decades of
increasing globalisation, an increasing number of
global producers began to command the capability
to physically transform inputs into outputs for prod-
ucts destined for global markets; second, at the same
time the barriers to international exchange have
fallen. Consequently, we have witnessed an increas-
ing supply of many commodities (using my termi-
nology), not just primary products, but also
increasingly manufactures and services such as
tourism. The result has been a tendency towards
systemic 'overproduction' (or its counterpart, under-
consumption) (Brenner 1998). These dual processes
have meant that the incomes of non-scarce factors
have been, and will continue to be, diminished. The
key abundant factor whose income has been under
threat has been labour. My central contention is that
labour is in excess supply globally and it is this
which largely explains the fall in living standards
(both relative and absolute) of much of the world's
population. Operating in a world of unemployment
and excess labour, the consequence has been the
erosion of living standards all over the world. This is
a process which I refer to as immiserising growth -
that is, an expansion of economic activity which
coincides with a decline in real incomes.
This process was foreseen in different ways by both
Malthus and Marx. Malthus believed that real liv-
ing standards would fall as a consequence of rising
population. This could be reversed by either (what
he strangely called the 'positive' check of) raised
mortality, or as a consequence of the 'preventative'
check of reduced fertility as couples married at a
later age. In the absence of the 'preventative' check,
standards of living would fall, mortality would rise
and incomes would only be restored when the
population balance had been restored.3 Marx
observed a similar tendency However, for him the
outcome of fallïng living standards was not so
Table 2: Share of country income groups (and China and India) in global population and
global labour force
Source: Calculated from World Bank, World Development Indicators, 1997
much a consequence of an autonomous rise irs the
population, but a result of growing capital-intensifi-
cation in production which would lead to the expan-
sion of 'the reserve army of labour' (Marx 1876:633).
There is a clear overlap between Marx's reserve
army of labour and the theory of the labour surplus
economy in post-1950s development economics.
As Ranis points out, for development to proceed
without falling welfare 'the volume of agricultural
[LDC} workers freed up through productivity
increase in the agricultural sector must not be too
far out of line with the new employment opportu-
nities created in the non-agricultural sector [the
lACs]'. And, further 'The markets for the goods of
the agricultural and non- agricultural sectors must
clear without a major change in the inter-sectoral
terms of trade' (Ranis 1987:106).
It is my contention that the growing gap between
global labour demand and supply undermines
Ranish sanguine perspective on the reserve army of
labour. The liberalisation of product markets in the
global economy after the 1950s has been associated
with a growing incidence of unemployment in the
industrialised economies, especially in those (non
Anglo-Saxon) economies where wages have not
faIlen. Rates of unemployment in the late 1990s
are, in many cases, not dissimilar to those of the
There is a heated debate in the literature on whether
unemployment in the lACs is the direct consequence of
globalisation or not (Clinc 1997; Wood 1998). Some
observers argue that these growing levels of
unemployment are due to autonomous technical change,
rather than to the displacement of labour by imports of
labour-intensive manufactures from LDCs. The counter-
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1930s. A similar process of labour displacement is
to be seen in developing countries. In Latin America
and the Caribbean, labour displacement has led to
growing urban unemployment, especially in the
three largest economies, Argentina, Brazil and
Mexico (Bhalla 1998); this was before the crisis
which hit Brazil (and then Mercosur) in 1997. In
addition, both the overall population and the active
labour force in the developing world are a very large
proportion of the global totals (Table 2). The reser-
voir of unemployed labour in developing countries
thus has the proportionate capacity to easily drown
the employed labour force in the industrially
advanced economies.
It might be argued that, even if this reserve army of
surplus labour in the developing world leads to the
fall of wages in these labour-surplus developing
economies, this will have little impact on wage
incomes in the industrialised economies. This is
because this reserve army does not have the skills to
compete with rich country workers. It is here that
the global economy emerging in the early twenty-
first century appears to be entering a decisive new
phase. Increasingly, workers in the developing world
possess both the skills and the industrial experience
to compete with rich country labour forces, even in
the industrial sector, which was formerly the spe-
cialised preserve of the rich economies in global
argument is that technological change is to a
considerable extent a response to the threat of imports
from low-wage countries. For the purposes of my
argument at this stage, it does not really matter which of
these viewpoints is correct; rather, it is the existence of
high levels of unemployment which is important.
Population I.abour force
1980 1995 2010 (est.) 1980 1995
Low income 53.7 56.1 58.0 52.2 54.9
Low income (exci. China and India) 16.0 18.5 21.6 14.3 16.0
Middle income 27.9 28.0 28.0 27.7 27.9
Lower middle income 20.4 20.3 20.1 20.3 20.2
Upper middle income 7.5 7.7 7.9 7.4 7.6
High income 18.4 15.9 14.1 20.2 17.2
China 22.1 21.2 19.7 22.6 23.0
India 13.1 14.3 20.8 20.2
trade. Partly as a consequence of this development,
the barriers to entry in the production of goods for
the global market have fallen, reflected in significant
increases in over-capacity in many sectors (Brenner
1998), and a decline in the relative prices of globally
traded goods. This has a direct bearing on the sec-
ond caveat made by Ranis (see quote above). Ranis's
sanguine view, as we have seen, is that the products
produced in the labour-surplus (developing)
economies must not experience sustained falls in
their terms of trade - 'the markets for the goods of
the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors must
clear without a major change in the inter-sectoral
terms of trade'. However, the consequence of grow-
ing industrial capacity in the developing world has
indeed led to just such a fall in the terms of trade.
But this time, unlike earlier periods when declining
terms of trade affected primary products (Singer
1950 and Prebisch 1950), it is being experienced in
manufactured goods (Wood 1997).
The new element, which I believe I bring to this story,
is to argue that the declining barriers to entry and the
growth of over-capacity is now no longer limited to
unskilled work and primary products (Singer and
Prebisch). They now apply increasingly to skilled
work and industrial products and, in so doing,
threaten to undermine the skills of a much larger
(and considerably more vocal) labour force. And,
here comes the specifically Gordon-twist in the argu-
ment. It is the entry of China (and, to a lesser extent,
india) which has expanded the global labour force so
significantly that there is no conceivable expectation
of the tight labour markets which Ricardo so cor-
rectly saw as being a necessary condition for a posi-
tive outcome to the process of sustained international
specialisation and the reaping of comparative advan-
tage. Also, as we shall see below this is an increas-
ingly experienced and skilled reserve army of labour.
4 Why is China (and India) an
Important Part of the Story?
It is not just because Gordon was a sinologist that
our attention turns to recent developments in
China. The issue which we will now explore is the
non-marginal nature of China's recent entry into the
global market. Consider, first, the size of China's
Wood's calculation of falling terms of trade in
manufactured exports is corroborated by a recent study
of the barter terms of trade in manufactures between
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contribution to global exports in a growing number
of product markets, particularly in the manufac-
tured products sector. Since her entry into these
global markets in the first half of the 1980s, China
has come to account for a growing share of imports
into each of the triad economies (Kaplinsky 1999).
In each of these markets, China is no longer a mar-
ginal supplier, but plays a major role in determining
overall product availability, and hence the prices
realised for these products; its presence therefore
also affects the terms of trade of all economies trad-
ing in these product categories. China's low pro-
duction costs arise from, and are coupled with,
growing industrial competence.
Next, consider the size of China's population and
labour force (Table 2 above). Here, too, China (and
india) has a non- marginal presence. In 1995,
China alone accounted for just over one fifth of
global population, and almost one quarter of the
global labour force. Together with India these pro-
portions rise respectively to over two thirds of the
global total. Therefore, developments in these
labour forces, when these economies are integrated
into the global labour force, have the capacity to
affect significantly global wage levels.
One of the most striking features of the Chinese
labour market is its growing level of education and
skilling (Table 3). By 1996, almost all primary school
age children were enrolled in education; 93 per cent
of primary school graduates entered secondary
school (an increase from 68 per cent in 1985); almost
half of junior secondary school graduates entered
senior secondary school. By 1996, over 400 million
people had completed primary education and, at the
opposite end of the spectrum, there were more than
6 million university graduates. More than 3 million
students entered technical schools, and a growing
number have begun studying abroad. At the same
time there has been a large growth in the number of
teachers, especially in secondary and higher educa-
tion. This has meant that pupilteacher ratios - 23.7
in primary schools - are remarkably low All of these
investments in education and training are reflected in
the growth of published material, for example the
more than fivefold increase in books published
between 1985 and 1996.
developing countries and the European Union, which
estimates an annual rate of depreciation of 2.2 per cent
between 1979 and 1994 (Maizels et al. 1998).
Table 3: Levels of education, 1985-96
In itself, none of this need lead to a decline in global
wages if there is full employment in China (and
India).6 However, even after a period of significant
growth, reaching 14.2 per cent in 1992 and exceed-
ing 8 per cent until 1996, China faces rapidly rising
open unemployment. Three major sources are
fuelling this growing unemployment problem. First,
starting in the mid-1980s large numbers of rural
workers have been migrating to urban areas in search
of employment, with estimates that 4 million
migrants per year will need to be absorbed annually
in urban areas. Second, each year approximately 12
million school or college leavers join the urban labour
force. Finally, contributing to the current upsurge and
raising fears of social unrest are the large numbers of
workers, previously disguised within the urban 'iron
rice bowl' system of guaranteed employment, being
This and the following two paragraphs were
contributed by Sarah Cook.
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laid-off by bankrupt or restructuring state enterprises
(Cook and Maurer-Fazio 1999).
Official urban unemployment statistics include only
those formally registered and thus provide a partial
picture of the numbers involved. In 1997 the official
rate was 3.1 per cent or 5.7 million people, up from
2.5 per cent or 3.83 million in 1990 (State Statistical
Bureau 1998). These figures exclude workers who
are 'laid off' (xiagang) but still retain an attachment
to their original 'work unit'. Estimates of laid-off
workers in 1998 range from 8 to 11 million workers
(Ministry of Labour, interviews), with projections
that during the next few years approximately 3.5-4
million state-sector workers, and 5 million collec-
tive-enterprise workers will be laid off each year.
However, other estimates for xiagang workers at the
1985 1990 1995 1996
% of school age in education 96.0 97.8 98.5 98.8
% of primary school graduates entering junior
secondary school
68.4 74.6 90. 8 92.6
% of junior secondary school graduates
entering senior secondary school
41 .7 40.6 48.3 48.8
Numbers in technical schools 761,000 1,567,000 2,874,000 3,348,000
Number of students studying abroad 2,124 2,950 20,381 20,905
Numbers with:
University education 6,140,000
Three years of college education 9,620,000
Completing specialised secondary school 17,280,000
Completing senior secondary school 72,600,000
Completing junior secondary school 263,000,000
Completing primary school 420,000,000
Number of full-time teachers
Higher education 247,000 395,000 401,000 403,000
Secondary schools 3,171,000 3,492,000 3,883,000 4,040,000
Primary schools 5,499,000 5,582,000 5,664,000 5,736,000
Pupil teacher ratio
Colleges and universities 5.0 5.2 7.2 7.5
Secondary schools 17.2 14,6 15.9 16.4
Primary schools 24.9 21.9 23.3 23.7
Number of books published 21,621 80,224 101,381 112,813
Source: China Statistical Abstract, 1997
end of 1997 are as high as 14.4 million, bringing the
total number of urban unemployed to approxi-
mately 20 million out a total of 147 million formal
urban employees (State Statistical Bureau 1998).
The Ministry of Labour estimates that open urban
unemployment may rise to 7.4 per cent by 2000
without effective job creation, while more recent
projections for 1999 suggest an unemployment rate
of 9 per cent in 1999 (Summary of World
Broadcasts, FE/3402 G/7, 5 December 1998).
Significantly, the average education level of the offi-
cially registered unemployed is above the average
level for the work-force as a whole. Fifty-two per
cent of urban unemployed have junior middle
school education, 34 per cent senior middle school
and 4.1 per cent college education, compared with
the average for all employees of 35 per cent primary
school, 38 per cent junior middle school, 12.1 per
cent senior middle school and 3.5 per cent college
leavers (State Statistical Bureau 1998).
This growth in the incidence of skilled unemployed
took place during periods of rapid economic and
export growth. But as the millennium dawns, China
faces a decline in both. Compared to the heady >10
per cent growth rates of the first half of the 1990s, the
projected rates for post-2000 are in the range of
5.3-7.4 per cent (China Concept Consulting 1998).
Export growth, too, has fallen sharply, with little
improvement in 1998 after growing previously at
more than 20 per cent per annum for much of the
1 990s. Furthermore, China's projected accession to
the VITO is likely tobe associated with a reduction in
tariffs and other import barriers, exposing much of its
inefficient industry to international competition, and
therefore forcing the further displacement of labour.
The size of China reserve army of labour can there-
fore be expected to grow significantly in the future.
5 Conclusions
What conclusions can be drawn from this? On the
one hand, there are undoubted efficiency gains aris-
ing from international specialisatiori. In a competi-
tive world, these efficiency gains will be reflected in
The choice of colours reflects the broad political
coalitions which are likely to group around these pro-
and anti-globalisation options.
Writing in a similar period of globalisation in the late
nineteenth century, both Lenin and Hobbs argued that
capitalism had a systemic tendency towards
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a reduction in product costs and an improvement in
product availability and quality Those consuming
these internationally produced products will reap
these efficiency gains.
There are two primary routes to consumption
power. The first is employment. But, in the absence
of full employment, a second source of income
arises from the redistribution of consumption power
from those who are able to maintain employment to
those whose jobs are displaced in this process of
international specialisation. Assuming that these two
conditions are met, increasing openness has much
to offer. (These are two of the important assump-
tions which underlay Ricardo's model of compara-
tive advantage - see Section 3 above). Let us think of
this as the 'blue globalisation scenario'.7
However, even if these two conditions are met,
globalisation may not be a positive-sum game. This
is because falling terms of trade may reduce the
consumption power of incomes. We can charac-
tense this world in which globalisation is not a pos-
itive-sum game as the 'red globalisation scenario'.
Let us consider each of the three factors underlying
this red globalisation scenario. For reasons discussed
in earlier sections, I believe that the spectre of global
unemployment is likely to grow rather than to
diminish - Maithusian (population growth),
Marxian (capital intensification) and Hobbsian
(overproduction/underconsumption) explanations
underlie this systemic trend towards surplus labour.8
Second, with regard to the politics of redistribution,
globalisation has led to wars of incentives by gov-
ernments anxious to attract an increasing share of
globally mobile investment. These incentives have
increasingly eroded tax bases, and thus weakened
the capacity of states to move resources from the
gainers to the losers.9 The political capacity of gov-
ernments to fund social expenditures and other
forms of income transfer has been undermined by
the conscious and systematic spread of 'Thatcherite'
ideologies by global carriers of ideology such as the
Murdoch empire (which Gordon, justifiably, hated).
underconsumption, and that this was one of the major
factors driving imperialism.
This was an issue which especially troubled Gordon,
and the programme of work which he mapped out just
prior to his death was precisely targeted at the provision
of the social wage.
Finally, considering the terms of trade effect in
which even those with incomes experience declin-
ing consumption power, we need to distinguish
between three types of terms of trade. The first is
the barter terms of trade. This refers to the rate of
exchange between two sets of goods. If exports
grow more rapidly than the barter terms of trade
decrease, then the income terms of trade can grow
despite falls in the barter terms of trade. In other
words, rising export volumes mean that total
import capacity (which, as Rodrik (1999) reminds
us, is the ultimate objective of openness) may
increase. This, as can be seen, is what has indeed
happened for many parts of the developing world
over the past decade, although for some regions
(notably low-income countries excluding India and
China) even the income terms of trade have fallen.
The issue now, which the red scenario in part
depends on, is whether the growth of global pro-
ductive capacity andlor the rise of protection in the
major markets (see below) will reduce the space for
global trade growth. That is, if exports grow at less
than the decline in the barter terms of trade, then
import capacity falls.
However, even if the income terms of trade fall, not
all the employed may suffer equally Despite falling
barter and income terms of trade, the terms of trade
of particular sets of factors (for example, those work-
ing in the export sector) will improve - these are the
factoral terms of trade. This has indeed been the case
for many developing country workers employed in
export-oriented activities (for example Export
Promotion Zones). In China, for example, between
1978 and 1997, real urban wages more than dou-
bled from Y615 to Y1,342.6 (real Y1978), and from
$74 to $161.8 (at official exchange rates)," reflecting
in part China's growing success in global markets. In
the Dominican Republic, real wages (in US$s) in the
export processing zones fell less than real wages in
other sectors as the currency was repeatedly deval-
ued (Kaplinsky 1993). From the perspectives of
individual groups, therefore, factoral terms of trade
may increase (providïng a powerful and vocal lobby
for globalisation, reflecting an alliance between the
managerial and capitalist classes and what used to be
These wages were computed by Kenneth Fung from
various editions of the China Statistical Yearbooh (CSY).
"There has been growing criticism of Chinab desire to
enter the World Trade Organisation, including by the
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called the 'labour aristocracy') even whilst aggregate
living standards (the incomes terms of trade) might
decrease, negatively affecting the living standards of
less powerful, marginalised and rural groups.
If all of this is correct, the sustainability of globalisa-
tion depends on the ability of those who have gained
from globalisation to sustain their political ascen-
dancy over those who are losing. Is this political bal-
ance likely to endure? Here the key battles are likely
to be fought in three parts of the global economy
The first is in the USA where the first salvoes have
been fought over the banana trade, a small battle
that presages an extended battlefront for the presi-
dential election campaign in 2000. Rapid growth in
the US - in employment, in GDP and the stock mar-
ket - has fostered the revival of economic activity in
parts of East Asia. But it has been built on borrow-
ing from the rest of the world, with the US trade gap
widening from $160 billion in 1997 to $235 billion
in 1998. It is a shaky edifice, not least because of the
unsustainable growth of the NYSE. When stocks fall
(as even the head of the US Federal Reserve Bank,
Greenspan, is now predicting) and hence when per-
sonal consumption falls (as personal savings, now
negative, rise in response to falling asset values) and
unemployment begins to rise, the balance may eas-
ily sway in favour of more protection. In Europe,
high rates of unemployment and the rise of proto-
fascist and racist parties provide fertile ground for
new forms of protectionism. And in China and other
parts of the developing world that offer potential
markets to global production, the social and politi-
cal tensions that are surfacing are leading many to
question the ability of the Chinese military and
political establishment to maintain its current out-
ward-oriented growth trajectory'
This red globalisation scenario is usually greeted with
a 'don't cry wolf' response, or by those who argue that
the benefils of globalisation are so great that nothing
will be able to undermine them. But the same may
have been said in the late nineteenth century'2 Then,
too, globalisation seemed to be associated with a
closing of the gap in inter-country living standards.
Yet, as Williamson shows, the consequent rising
powerful mayor of Jinan in Shandong, Xie Yutang
(Financial limes, 7 July 1999).
"In many respects, the degree of global integration
before the First World War exceeded that of the late
1990s (Bairoch and Kozul-Wright 1996).
intra-national income inequality led to a less open
world (Williamson 1998:69). At that time, the
arena of disputation with regard to globalisation
was the trade in unskilled labour (through migra-
tion); in this generation it is likely to be global flows
of goods, services and, perhaps, even finance.
So, there are good reasons to question the political
sustainability of continued openness. However, as
Gordon frequently argued, we are not only acade-
mic observers; we are also responsible human
beings. As Marx remarked, 'it is not enough to
understand the world, it is also necessary to change
it'. This being the case, what normative responses
might we have to these developments, given our
personal and institutional identification with the
interests of the poor and disadvantaged? Here, there
are a number of alternatives. One possibility is that
we continue to pressurise for a political dispensa-
tion that will allow for the redistribution of some of
the gains to those who lose from globalisation, both
within countries and between countries, But the
prospect of this 'blue route', I have suggested, looks
increasingly bleak.3 A second alternative, the one in
which we actively engage ourselves in at the IDS, is
to assist the growth of competitive capabilities of
poor producers and of poor countries. This will
enable them either to improve their barter terms of
trade (by climbing up the value-added chain) or to
win greater global market share, hence allowing
their rising income terms of trade to exceed the
declining barter terms of trade. What troubles me
about this route, is that we provide simultaneous
help with upgrading capabilities in different coun-
tries, in each case only heightening the competition
which these producers experience in global mar-
kets. The advice to 'upgrade' is one which classi-
cally faces the fallacy of composition challenge, that
is, upgrading is a relative concept and only makes
sense if all other rivals are static or upgrade less.
By a process of elimination, this leaves only one fur-
ther route open - reducing the intensity of open-
ness and redefining its boundaries. Based in Europe
or North America, the position is clear. Reducing
imports of goods from countries with low wages
lt is no coincidence that the funding of both aid
budgets and development studies has declined. Dudley
Seers predicted that this would happen if and when
'communism' fell. He believed that 'development' was
the West's sop to poor countries to prevent them from
taking the communist path (personal communication).
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may lower the consumption power of incomes (by
increasing product prices and reducing quality), but
may lead to higher levels of employment and thus
spread consumption power more widely through
the economy14 Labour markets are probably suffi-
ciently 'tight' in these economies to sustain full
employment and reasonable levels of income.
Reduced capital mobility will also undermine the
need for governments to ratchet-up their incentives
to investors, and hence make it more feasible to
raise the tax. Notionally, it may also be possible to
disrupt the inflow of 'liberalising ideologies' and
hence also improve the political environment
favouring redistributive policies.
But we are also global citizens, particularly those of
us who, like Gordon, are part of the 'development
community'. The impact of reduced openness on
those economies that will be excluded from these
markets is more complex. On the one hand are a
group of countries - the low-income countries
excluding China and India, the Middle East and
North Africa - who have largely failed to gain from
globalisation. Their problem is not so much one of
excess population bidding down wages, but of a
failure to upgrade their productivity to sustain or
grow their shares of global markets. Although their
elites with consumption power may have gained,
the purchasing power of the mass of the population
may have fallen, despite rising levels of economic
activity In their case, although declining openness
may reduce the overall potential efficiency of factor
use, it may in fact lead to a situation in which idle
resources may be brought into use, and more of the
population included in production, hence receiving
incomes. lt may well be, for example, that the
masses of the population in sub-Saharan Africa may
in fact gain from reduced openness and a greater
degree of self-sufficiency
But what impact will reduced openness have on
those countries that have gained from increased
openness but have vast pools of excess labour? Their
populations will stand to lose much more from the
erosion of openness, with globalisation leading to a
significant levelling-down of incomes, even though
11 Of course this rise in employment will be lessened by
the loss of export sales to economies who find it difficult
to export in the new global environment.
these may be more equally distributed. Bearing in
mind that, as we have seen above, China probably
falls into both groups of countries, this is a worrying
conclusion, and one which might have especially
troubled Gordon with his fascination for China.
We are thus faced with two broad outcomes. On the
one hand, in the absence of robust redistributive
mechanisms (which globalisation tends to erode),
sustained globalisation will in the long run lead to
declining standards of living for all those producers
who are not able to surround themselves with bar-
riers to entry. As we have seen, with the develop-
ment of productive capabilities and education in
LDCs, this covers an increasing segment of the
global population. They are likely to suffer either
from high levels of unemployment or immiserising
growth. Both consequences arise from the existence
of a global reserve army of (skilled) labour. On the
other hand, reduced openness will concentrate the
reserve army of labour in regions where it is cur-
rently geographically located - that is, in poor
References
Bairoch P, and R. Kozul-Wright, 1996,
'Globalization myths: some historical reflections
on integration, industrialization and growth in
the world economy', UNCTAD Discussion Paper
No. 13, March, Geneva.
Bhalla, A. S. (ed.), 1998, Globalization, Growth and
Marginalization, New York: Macmillan and IDRC.
Brenner, R., 1998, 'Uneven development and the
long downturn: the advanced capitalist
economies from boom to stagnation,
1950-1998', New Left Review, 229.
China Concept Consulting, 1998, 'China SOE
reform: Sichuan and Liaoning appraisal and
design mission', Report prepared for Department
for International Development, Hong Kong.
Cline, W, 1997, Trade and Income Distribution,
Washington DC.: Institute for International
Economics.
Cook, S. and G. White, 1998, 'The changing pat-
tern of poverty in China: issues for research and
policy', IDS Working Paper 67; Policy Research
Programme, Brighton: Institute of Development
Studies.
Cook S., and Maurer-Fazio, M., (eds), 1999,
'Introduction: the iron rice bowl meets the market:
labour in China's transition', special issue, Journal
of Development Studies, Vol. 35, No. 3, February
115
countries in general and probably in China and
India (who will have reduced access to global mar-
kets) in particular. This latter group of countries
thus face the spectre of immiserisation in a much
shorter time-span than would have been the case
had the reserve army of labour worked its way
through to incomes at a global level in an open
world. Short of Maithusian 'positive' checks on
population size (for example, the AIDS crisis in SSA
may tighten labour markets), the prospects are par-
ticularly bleak in these countries.
I do not find this Malthusian view a comfortable
conclusion. Nor would have Gordon. But short of a
renewal of the politics of redistribution and inclu-
sion - the most desirable outcome - or the mass
famines/wars/AIDS epidemics which Maithus
referred to as 'positive checks' to the growth of the
labour force, I reluctantly see no other outcome.
The direction for individual and group action is
thus clear. But how would Gordon have felt to find
himself in a 'blue' globalisation camp?
Dunford M., 1994, 'Winners and losers: the new
map of economic inequality in the European
Union', European Urban and Regional Studies, Vol.
1, No. 2: 95-114.
Eurostat, 1998, Intra- and Extra-EU Trade (Arrival
Data-Combined Nomenclature), Supplement
2/1998 (CD-Rom), Luxembourg: Statistical
Office of the European Communities.
Hartog, J., 1999, 'Country employment policy
reviews: the Netherlands', Social Dialogue and
Employment Success, ILO Symposium 2-3
March, Geneva: ILO.
ILO, 1999, World Employment Report 1998-99,
Geneva: ILO.
Kaplinsky R., 1993, 'Export processing zones in
the Dominican Republic: transforming manufac-
tures into commodities', World Development, Vol.
22, No. 3: 185 1-65.
Kaplinsky, R., 1998, 'Globalisation, industrialisa-
tion and the pursuit of the nth rent', IDS
Discussion Paper No. 365, Brighton: Institute of
Development Studies.
Kaplinsky, R., 1999, 'Is globalisation all it is really
cracked up to be?', paper presented to the
Gordon White Memorial Conference, April 30
1999, Brighton: Institute of Development
Studies.
Lewis, W A., 1954, 'Economic development with
unlimited supplies of labour', Manchester School of
Economics and Social Studies journal 22: 139-9 1.
Maizels, A., K. Berge, T. Crowe and T. B. Palaskas,
1998, 'Trends in the manufactures terms of trade
of developing countries', mimeo, Oxford: Finance
and Trade Policy Centre, Queen Elizabeth House.
Maithus, T. R., 1926, An Essay on the Principles of
Population, London: Macmillan [1798].
Marx, K., Capital: A Critique of Political Economy
[1876], Vol. 1, London: Lawrence and Wishart.
Prebisch, R., 1950, The Economic Development of
Latin America and its Principal Problems, New York:
ECLA, UN Department of Economic Affairs.
Pullen, J. M., 1987, 'Malthus', in J. Eatwell, M.
Milgate and P Newman, (eds.), The New Pal grave:
A Dictionaiy of Economics, London: Macmillan.
Rodrik, D., 1999, 'The new global economy and
developing countries: making openness work',
Policy Essay No. 24, Washington: Overseas
Development Council.
Ranis, G., 1987, 'Labour surplus economies', in J.
Eatwell, M. Milgate and P Newman, (eds), The
New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, London:
Macmillan.
Rodriguez, F., and D. Rodrik, 1999, 'Trade policy
and economic growth: the sceptic's guide to
cross-national evidence, NBER Working Paper No.
7081, Cambridge, Mass.: NBAER.
Schumpeter J., 1961, The Theory of Economic
Development, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Singer, H., 1950, 'The distribution of gains between
borrowing and investing countries', American
Economic Review, Vol. 40: 473-85.
Smith, A., 1776, An Enquiry into the Nature and
Cause of The Wealth of Nations, Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
116
State Statistical Bureau, 1997, China Statistical
Abstract 1997, Beijing: China Statistical
Publishing House.
State Statistical Bureau, 1998, China Labour
Statistical Yearbook, Beijing: China Statistical
Publishing House.
Streeten, P., 1998, 'Globalization: threat or salva-
tion', in A. S. Bhalla (ed.), 1998, Globalization,
Growth and Marginalization, New York:
Macmillan and IDRC.
Toye, J., 1998, 'J. M. Keynes and the Cambridge
doctrine of the terms of trade: a review with
unpublished evidence', mimeo, Brighton:
Institute of Development Studies.
United States, 1997, Economic Report of the
President, Transmitted to the Congress February
1997 together with the Annual Report of the Council
of Economic Advisers, Washington, DC: United
States Government Printing Office
Williamson, J. G., 1998, 'Globalization, labor mar-
kets and policy backlash in the past', journal of
Economic Perspectives, Vol. 12, No. 4, Fall: 51-72.
Wood, A., 1994, North-South Trade, Employment
and Inequality: Changing Fortunes in a Skill-driven
World, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Wood, A., 1997, 'Openness and wage inequality in
developing countries: the Latin American chal-
lenge to East Asian conventional wisdom', World
Bank Economic Review, Vol. 11, No. 1: 33-57.
Wood, A., 1998, 'Globalisation and the rise in
labour market inequalities', Economic journal,
Vol. 108, No. 450: 1463-82.
World Bank, 1997, World Development Indicators,
1997, Washington: World Bank.
World Bank, 1996, Poverty Reduction and the World
Bank, Washington: World Bank.
